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Abstract 
Civil society organisations are often seen as playing a crucial role in helping to mitigate the 
exclusion of weaker states, giving voice to marginalised communities, and raising 
environmental and developmental concerns within the trade system. The politicisation and 
demystification of the global trade agenda by civil society also opens space for a more 
diverse set of actors to influence trade negotiations. This article examines the evolution of 
the WTO secretariat’s engagement with civil society within this context and argues that the 
dominant mode of engagement, as manifest in WTO Public Forums and civil society 
participation in ministerial conferences, is no longer fit for purpose. Rather it reflects an 
outmoded strategy that once served to underscore the existence and value of the WTO as 
an international organisation and now works to neutralize political contestation and 
publicly promote the benefits of free trade. It is now in need of reform. 
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Reforming WTO-civil society engagement 
 
Much of the recent commentary on the state of the multilateral trading system has focused 
on the lack of consensus among member states on how to reinvigorate the World Trade 
Organization’s (WTO) negotiating pillar (see, for example, Hoekman, 2012; Deere-
Birkbeck, 2011). This is unsurprising given the travails of the Doha negotiations and the 
decision to set the round aside at the organisation’s 10th ministerial conference in Nairobi 
in December 2015 (see Wilkinson, Hannah and Scott, 2016).  Yet, as WTO officials have 
been quick to remind us, behind the drama of the Doha round the non-negotiating aspects 
of the multilateral trading system have continued to function, and to do so well (see 
Azevêdo, 2015). The Dispute Settlement Body, though perhaps slightly overburdened, has 
been praised for dampening tensions between members that might otherwise have become 
headline events (Marceau, 2015). The Trade Policy Review Body has continued monitoring 
member state compliance in a manner that has not caused major ripples. Aid for Trade is 
flowing to least developed countries (LDCs) and WTO members have pledged almost $90 
million to fund the second phase of the Enhanced Integrated Framework. The WTO’s 
Economic Research and Statistics Division has contributed to enhancing the transparency 
of global trade flows as well as providing information that serves as a basis for inter-
institutional co-ordination and analysis across the global trade landscape. And the WTO’s 
Information and External Affairs Division has played a major role in abating the once 
hostile relationship between the organisation and civil society. 
 
However, the smooth functioning of the WTO’s non-negotiating aspects has meant that 
they have not been subjected to the same kind of reform-orientated scrutiny as the system’s 
negotiating function (see, among others, Meléndez-Ortiz, Bellman and Mendoza, 2012; 
Warwick Commission, 2007; and Steger, 2009). Certainly, scholars and commentators 
have offered important suggestions for ironing out the creases in the dispute settlement 
and trade policy review processes (see, among many others, Hoekman, 2012; Georgiev and 
Van der Borght, 2006), but little beyond fine adjustment has been mooted. Yet, very little 
	 3 
has been said of the adjustments and reforms that could be made to the manner in which 
the WTO secretariat engages civil society. This is particularly pertinent given that—in 
contrast to other areas of WTO competence—no official review or reform process has been 
countenanced since a formal mode of engagement between the secretariat and civil society 
was first crafted.  This does not mean, however, that reforming secretariat-civil society 
engagement has been entirely absent from the reform agenda. The 2013 Panel of WTO 
Experts report WTO at the Crossroads: A Report on the Imperative of a WTO Reform Agenda 
had engagement with civil society as the first of its recommendations calling for ‘[e]ach 
WTO Member [to] strive to undertake a national trade dialogue with their own respective 
citizens’ (WTO, 2013: 31).  It simply means that to date no concerted effort has been put 
into reforming and refining the means by which the WTO engages civil society. 
 
There are good reasons to suggest that attention should now be turned to reviewing and 
reforming the manner in which the secretariat engages civil society. It is certainly the case 
that few, beyond a small hard core, now choose to demonstrate during WTO ministerial 
conferences; the proportion and the character of NGOs present during the organisation’s 
annual Public Forum has changed; and the way the secretariat engages non-state actors has 
evolved and matured.  All of this has been helped by a shift in the focus of public debate 
about trade towards mega-regional trade agreements such as the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) as well as the 
tectonic geopolitical, geoeconomic and geostrategic movements that have occurred in wider 
world politics (see, for instance, de Ville and Siles-Brügge, 2015).  
 
It is also the case that the manner in which the WTO engages civil society has been too 
narrowly focused on institutional needs and outcomes, rather than on more wide ranging 
objectives. This is perhaps unsurprising, but it has ensured that the WTO is out of step 
with those other international organisations that have sought to deepen and widen their 
engagement with public stakeholders (see Scholte, 2012); and it has put the WTO behind 
the curve in harnessing the role that civil society can play in setting agendas, shaping the 
way issues are understood, implementing and operationalising global norms (Friedman, 
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Hochstetler and Clark, 2005), and enhancing transparency, legitimacy and accountability 
(Buntaine, 2015). As such, secretariat-civil society engagement is in need of the same kind 
of reform-focused reflection that has been directed towards the rest of the multilateral 
trading system.  
 
Our purpose in this paper is to illustrate how, in its current form, the secretariat’s 
engagement with civil society inhibits that relationship from utilising the positive 
contributions that opening up the organisation to greater public engagement and scrutiny 
can bring. We argue that currently constructed secretariat-civil society engagement remains 
largely focused on a public relations strategy that was originally designed to underscore the 
existence and value of the WTO as an international organisation at a time when its 
purpose had been called into question. While this may have been important at the time, it 
does not serve a more general purpose of facilitating constructive dialogue about trade, the 
WTO, and civil society which, in turn, has the capacity to bring about more transformative 
outcomes—by which we mean a broadening of dialogue and debate; the introduction of 
alternative ideas, norms and discourses; the inclusion of otherwise marginalised voices; and 
the consideration of progressive social values about human health, welfare, and sustainable 
development. More meaningful and critical engagement with civil society—particularly with 
progressive NGOs and social movements—has the potential to transform fundamentally 
thinking about the way global trade can lift people out of poverty and serve development 
priorities. Moreover, giving space to critical voices for developing counter-narratives that 
push against the boundaries of conventional wisdom can serve to unsettle the underlying 
power dynamics of global trade. Such transformative outcomes are needed if we are to 
develop trade policies that serve better the needs and priorities of the world’s poorest 
people. Progressive NGOs and social movements are the best candidates for bringing about 
this type of transformative change. 
 
We argue that the dominant secretariat-civil society mode of engagement, manifest most 
obviously through the organisation and arrangement of the Public Forum and NGO 
attendance at ministerial conferences, is the consequence of an evolutionary process that 
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reflects the aims and objectives of an earlier time and an outmoded but nonetheless 
enduring perception of what the value of civil society is to the WTO (members and 
secretariat alike) rather than the other way around.  This mode of engagement is no longer 
tenable and it is now in need of reform.  
 
We draw our argument from three sources of data. First, we draw from an extensive 
programme of participant observation at ministerial conferences since 2003 and Public 
Forums since 2010 that has provided us with the opportunity for innumerable informal 
discussions with participants from civil society about their engagement with the WTO. 
Second, we have compiled and utilised an original data set of all civil society organisations 
registered at WTO ministerial conferences since 1999 and Public Forums since 2002, 
made available to us by the WTO secretariat for use in this research. The dataset includes 
the organisational and country affiliations of each participant at the WTO Public Forums 
and ministerial conferences. Each entry was coded as ‘state’, ‘NGO’, ‘Labour’, ‘Business’, 
or ‘Academic’. The Public Forum data also includes ‘individuals’ and ‘IGOs’. Each 
organisation is also coded according to their socio-economic classification as either global 
North or global South. This was determined through a combination of Human 
Development Index rankings and geography. The data are used to detail the changing 
dynamics of participation in these events and the evolving patterns of attendance by 
different types of civil society organisations. Third, we have conducted more than 100 
formal, informal, and semi-structured interviews with civil society groups, secretariat staff 
and WTO member delegates in the period 2003 to the present day. Taken together, these 
data sources provide a comprehensive picture of the changing dynamics of WTO-civil 
society relations. 
 
In developing our argument, the paper unfolds as follows. It begins by defining our terms 
and mapping out the changed nature of the civil society with which the secretariat engages. 
The paper then turns to the changed purposes that underpin the secretariat’s engagement 
with civil society as well as the enduring character of the mode of engagement that was put 
in place more than 15 years ago. Thereafter, the paper explores the impossibility of 
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broader, transformative social outcomes emerging from the mode of engagement’s current 
construction. The paper concludes by reflecting upon the possibilities that a changed mode 
of engagement might hold.  
 
The changed nature of civil society at the WTO 
By WTO-civil society engagement we are concerned primarily with relations between the 
secretariat and civil society rather than the WTO as a collection of members—though the 
latter are not unimportant particularly as it is upon the mandate given by member states 
that the secretariat is able to act. In this regard we are concerned with the secretariat not 
simply as a servant of the membership as it is often constructed, but also as an agent acting 
upon the authority bestowed upon it by the membership.  We take civil society to be 
private individuals and representatives of non-state groups including NGOs, labour 
(organised and unorganised), academics, business associations, and consumer 
organisations. More often than not, in the context of the WTO, civil society is taken to be 
NGOs alone, but this is only for convenience of mind and needs to be treated with 
caution. Equally, we need to be a little wary of the term ‘public’. In everyday usage, the 
term public is often treated synonymously with civil society. However, in the WTO context 
public is understood more in the sense of openness—hence it is a mistake to assume that 
we can draw a simple association between civil society and NGOs engaging with the WTO 
and a more wide ranging public engagement programme. The WTO’s broad approach to 
what constitutes public engagement is problematic in itself, as by including a greater range 
of actors—such as for-profit corporations—the space for civil society groups, particularly 
those with transformative agendas, has been increasingly crowded out. It is, nonetheless, an 
important point to note in terms of the evolution of the primary manifestation of the 
means by which the WTO engages with civil society—that is, via the Public Forum and 
ministerial conferences.  
 
The context of WTO-civil society engagement has changed dramatically since the 
demonstrations that first accompanied the 1998 ministerial conference in Geneva. Those 
events, and the on-the-streets public protests that followed during the Seattle (1999), 
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Cancún (2003), and Hong Kong (2005) ministerial conferences—not to forget the smaller 
demonstrations that took place inside these events and which would often get NGOs 
banned from attending press briefings during ministerial conferences—are now rare (see 
Wilkinson, 2003; Hopewell, 2015; Pianta, 2014). The last time a ministerial conference 
was held in Geneva in 2011, for instance, the only lasting demonstration was an unstaffed 
tent opposite the conference centre decked out in a few bedraggled banners. In Bali in 
2013 the handful of demonstrations that took place were far removed from the conference 
centre and out of the sight of member delegations. Demonstrations in Nairobi in 
December 2015 were limited to a small number of equally insignificant activities: a handful 
of protests involving no more than 25 people greeted ministers as they exited the 
conference centre each day; in the streets surrounding the conference South Korean 
farmers denounced the WTO and hand written proclamations stating that ‘trade is war’ 
were scattered among the tents of the NGO centre drawing from the recent book of the 
same name by Yash Tandon (2015); and the NGO coalition Our World Is Not For Sale held 
regular court with the press and social media as well as with Kenyan-based NGOs.  
 
More generally, the number of civil society organisations registering to attend ministerial 
conferences, as well as those actually attending, has fallen to such an extent that some of 
the most significant groups have declared that ministerial conferences are no longer 
sufficiently important to warrant the sending of a delegation (as Oxfam decided ahead of 
the Bali conference—see Benicchio, 2013). Such is the decline that the number of 
organisations attending has fallen from a high of 960 in Cancún in 2003 to a low of 232 in 
Nairobi in 2015. 
 
Overall, two distinct periods can be identified—high numbers of civil society organisations 
registering to attend ministerial meetings in the run-up to and during the early stages of the 
DDA negotiations when a deal looked most likely to be agreed (that is, up until July 2008), 
followed by subsequent disengagement as the round became increasingly moribund. The 
Doha (November 2001) ministerial conference is an obvious outlier in this trend. The 
relatively low levels of attendees in Qatar is explained by the restrictions placed on civil 
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society activity and limited possibility of protest, and by the fact that the conference took 
place shortly after the attacks of 11th September 2001 at which point many chose not to 
travel by air. The stark decline in civil society attendance at and engagement with WTO 
ministerial conferences across all categories has reinforced the centrality of the Public 
Forum as the primary mode of engagement between civil society groups and the WTO with 
attendance at the Forum—in aggregate numbers at least—proving more robust.  
 
Figure 1: Civil society organizations registering to attend ministerial conferences, 1999-
2015 
 
 
Things have changed at the Public Forum as well, though in less obvious ways. Official 
statistics—shared with us by the WTO secretariat—show that the total number of 
participants at each Forum across the event’s life span has remained remarkably constant, 
albeit with notable peaks in 2005, 2007 and 2011 (see Figure 2). However, what these 
figures hide are the changes that have occurred in the character of attendees. The 
complexion of the communities represented has shifted away from activist groups and 
NGOs to those representing economic interests. Indeed, it is significant that among those 
registering to attend the Public Forum are both non-profit business associations such as the 
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Canadian Hatching Egg Producers and for-profit corporations such as AT&T and Daimler 
Chrysler, which do not fit neatly with common understandings of what are considered to 
be constituents of civil society. Registration by a number of intergovernmental 
organisations (IGOs) and state-based representatives such as those working in permanent 
missions to the WTO also inflates the number of participants at the Public Forum. Indeed, 
the combined number of state and IGO representatives registering for the Public Forum 
obscures what is in reality a year-on-year decline in civil society participation.  
 
Figure 2: Public Forum participants, 2002-2014 
 
 
It is also worth noting that the figures presented below relate to the total number of 
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which data is available in this respect is 2006, when two-thirds of registrants are reported 
0	200	
400	600	
800	1000	
1200	1400	
1600	1800	
2000	
2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	
Total	public	forum	participants	
	 10 
by the WTO to have attended.1 It is also important to note that the reported figures do not 
record the sessions that participants attend during the Forum: a significant proportion of 
delegates from the Geneva diplomatic community attend plenary sessions and a few other 
select panels only.  They are not present for the event in its entirety or many of the other 
sessions. This, in turn, ensures that plenary sessions are busy and makes the Public Forum 
appear well attended.  
 
Figure 3: Public Forum participants by category, 2002-2014 
 
 
                                                
1 According to the WTO with respect to the 2006 Public Forum: ‘A total of 1,396 persons registered to 
participate in this year's Forum (see chart for breakdown by category of registered participants) and 136 
additional people were registered manually after the expiry date of the on-line registration.  Approximately 
1'000 participants actually attended the event.’ See: 
https://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/public_forum_e/forum06_e.htm 
0!
200!
400!
600!
800!
1000!
1200!
1400!
1600!
1800!
2000!
2002! 2004! 2006! 2008! 2010! 2012! 2014!
Individuals!
IGOs!
Misc!
State!
NGO!
Labour!
Business!
Academic!
	 11 
How marked have these shifts really been? As Figure 3 shows, since 2010 business groups 
(comprising for-profit industry representatives as well as non-for-profit business 
associations) have contributed the most participants, reversing the preceding norm wherein 
NGOs were typically the largest group. In 2013, business registered fully 55 per cent more 
delegates than NGOs, though this subsequently fell back to 27 per cent more in 2014. 
NGOs now typically make up the fourth largest group of participants, having also been 
overtaken by state representatives and representatives of universities and schools. 
Representation from other potentially more critical civil society groups has also fallen back.  
For instance, attendance by labour groups reached a peak of four per cent of the total 
participants in 2005 before falling back to around one per cent after 2008.  
 
When combined, business, state and IGO representatives make up approximately half of 
the audience at Public Forums. If Public Forum attendance can be taken as a crude proxy 
measure, business interest in the multilateral trading system (and perhaps the networking 
opportunities that the Forum affords) is actually more pronounced than has been 
suggested (consider, for instance, Woll, 2013: 258). Importantly, civil society—private, non-
state, not-for-profit groups—has over time become a less important constituency at the 
Public Forum, which might be a trend worth reversing if secretariat-civil society 
engagement is to have any continuing value. 
 
The WTO secretariat provides one additional entry point for NGOs working on trade-
related issues in addition to the Public Forum and the side-lines of ministerial conferences. 
Geneva-based organisations can apply for accreditation to the secretariat, receive regular 
briefings from the secretariat, and attend public hearings of some of the WTO dispute 
settlement proceedings. The issuing of badges is meant to facilitate the entry of NGOs to 
the Centre William Rappard building.  Currently 52 Geneva-based NGO representatives 
hold such badges.2  
 
                                                
2 See ‘NGOs and the WTO’ - https://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/ngo_e.htm. 
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That said, it remains the case that when attendance at the Public Forum is scrutinised 
closely we see that the character of civil society engagement with the WTO has changed 
considerably. Public expressions of disaffection with the trade agenda have almost 
disappeared from ministerial conferences and Public Forums alike. The consequence is 
that secretariat-civil society relations have been boiled down to a whisper of protest at 
ministerial conferences and a Public Forum that is dominated by non-civil society actors. 
And because of the composition of the delegates in attendance at both events, this 
inevitably ensures that a certain character is lent to the meetings—how they are run, what is 
talked about, what kind of interaction takes place.  
 
Given that the dominant view of the majority of these attendees is generally status 
quo/WTO supporting, the space for alternative views is limited. This development is 
perhaps best illustrated by the themes of Public Forum panels.  The Secretariat selects 
panels from the pool that has been proposed by participants (the complexion of which, as 
we have outlined, is increasingly dominated by business, state and IGO representatives), 
based on the quality of proposed speakers, range of voices and ‘fit’ with the overall theme 
of the Forum. The large majority of these sessions focus on the technicalities associated 
with enhancing the functioning of the multilateral trade system—implementation, rules 
compliance and dispute settlement, competitiveness, global value chains, jobs growth, 
technical innovation—and celebrating the benefits of freer trade.  Very few are concerned 
with challenging prevailing orthodoxies or providing meaningful opportunities to engage 
in critical discussions about the more iniquitous aspects of global trade governance.3 Since 
participants put the panels forward they may give an indication of the issues that key 
groups wish to discuss, but because of the selection process by the Secretariat, this view 
cannot be taken as representative. Moreover, because of the selectivity, participants may 
self-censor in what they propose.   
 
                                                
3 Public Forum programmes are available through the website: 
https://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/public_forum_e/public_forum_e.htm 
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Clearly there are important corollaries here—such as why civil society interest in the WTO 
has fallen so dramatically. Without doubt a component of the explanation of NGO 
disengagement with the WTO lies with the lack of progress in the Doha round. For civil 
society groups facing resource constraints and operating on a model of pursuing a small 
number of key campaign areas at any one time, once the WTO negotiations showed little 
sign of moving beyond the 2008 impasse their attention was bound to turn elsewhere—to 
the global financial crisis, the inclusion of Investor State Dispute Settlement mechanisms 
in mega-regional agreements, and to sustainable development and poverty alleviation more 
generally. NGO engagement with the Public Forum was fairly steady throughout the early 
years of the Doha negotiations, with a particular peak in 2005 coinciding with the highly 
politicized Hong Kong ministerial conference (Wilkinson, 2006). This engagement was 
maintained through to the 2009 Public Forum, at which the topic under discussion—
“Global Problems, Global Solutions: Towards Better Global Governance”—was one that 
encouraged greater input from NGOs pushing for change in the trade system and 
maintained their interest. The year 2010, however, saw a fall of 22 per cent in the number 
of NGOs registering to attend, and set in train a new period of significantly lower 
engagement by NGOs with the Public Forum as many moved on to new campaign areas.  
 
This disengagement by civil society has the result of narrowing the range of voices heard at 
the event and reducing the set of ideas that are put forward in response to the questions 
posed by the Public Forum. The space in which civil society engages with the multilateral 
trade system has contracted considerably, leaving the discussion as one primarily conducted 
between state, IGO and business representatives. It is not, however, just the character of 
civil society attending WTO events that has changed over time and which requires 
attention in any process of reform. So too have the underlying purposes—but importantly 
not the methods—of the secretariat’s engagement with civil society.  It is to the issue of 
changed purpose but continuity of method that we now turn.  
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The changed purposes that underpin the secretariat’s enduring engagement with civil society 
Despite the changes that we observe in the composition and behaviour of civil society at 
Public Forums and ministerial conferences, the way the secretariat engages civil society has 
not changed markedly at all. It remains largely unidirectional, constructed to ‘educate’ and 
‘celebrate’ the benefits of trade leaving unaltered the mechanisms governing WTO-civil 
society engagement. That said, there has been a change in the purposes underpinning that 
engagement that has resulted from the changed circumstances in which the WTO has 
found itself. It is important to understand why this combination of continuity in 
machinery but change in purpose has come about, as well as the effects on secretariat-civil 
society relations. To do this we need to recover briefly the genesis and evolution of WTO-
civil society engagement. 
 
The events of Geneva in 1998 and (infamously) Seattle in 1999 set in motion an 
institutional strategy designed to engage civil society that sought, simultaneously, to: 
 
1. promote public understanding of the benefits of trade; 
2. dissipate civil society hostility towards the WTO and the multilateral trade agenda; 
and 
3. preserve an arm’s length relationship between members and civil society groups. 
 
What resulted was a mode of engagement that privileged a uni-directional flow of 
information about the benefits of trade and the WTO from the secretariat to civil society 
but which had very little in the way of a feedback mechanism. As the DDA became ever 
more intractable—and more generally interest in global economic issues dissipated—the 
reasons for persisting with this mode of engagement shifted towards underpinning the 
continued relevance (indeed, the indispensability) of the WTO in the face of challenges 
that threatened to encourage a contrary view (for statements from WTO Directors General 
concerning threats to the organisation, see WTO, 2012; WTO, 2014). In this way, a shift 
occurred from a mode of engagement designed to dissipate civil society hostility to one that 
sought to shore up and justify the WTO’s raison d’etre. Yet, while the underlying reasons 
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may have changed, the mode of engagement did not. We explore each of these phases in 
turn. 
 
In the first phase, the secretariat sought to keep public interest in the WTO and its work at 
arm’s length, with the responsibility for civil society engagement in WTO and related 
affairs firmly placed with member states, resisting the movement of non-state actors to 
lobby the WTO directly (Scholte, O’Brien and Williams, 1998). As early as 1996, the 
General Council agreed a set of ‘Guidelines for Arrangements on Relations with Non-
Governmental Organizations’ (WTO, 1996), which set out the ‘broadly held view’ of 
precluding NGOs from any direct involvement in the work of the WTO or its meetings, 
and highlighting the importance of consultation at the national level, ‘where lies primary 
responsibility for taking into account the different elements of public interest which are 
brought to bear on trade policy-making’ (WTO, 1996; also Wilkinson, 2005). The WTO’s 
attempt to manage civil society relations while continuing to insulate itself from non-state 
input was also visible in the creation of the Public Forum (initially established as the Public 
Symposium) wherein civil society representatives could engage with the organisation but 
they could do so only away from—geographically as well as time-wise—the organisation’s 
primary decision-making body, the ministerial conference. It was no coincidence that the 
first Public Forum was held in July 2001 in the wake of the inflammatory 1999 Seattle 
ministerial conference and in the run-up to the November 2001 Doha ministerial meeting 
(at which the Doha round was launched). This public engagement strategy was 
complemented by the rolling out of an education programme which comprised the 
production of a series of information guides on the work of the WTO, as well as a huge 
investment in, and up-scaling of, the organisation’s website to correct what the secretariat 
saw as a number of errors in public perceptions about the institution and its work. The 
most notable of these was the ‘10 common misunderstandings about the WTO’ (WTO, 
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1999) which has subsequently morphed into ‘10 things the WTO can do’ (WTO, no 
date).4 
 
In the years running up to the turn of the millennium the extent of public ill-feeling 
toward the global trade agenda caught the secretariat very much on the back foot and the 
production of early information documents like ‘10 common misunderstandings ...’ 
reflected a knee-jerk and defensive response on the organisation’s part, as did the attempt 
to deflect criticism from itself and towards member states as the ‘appropriate’ venue for 
raising issues of concern. This was, however, to change. If the secretariat’s first response 
was defensive and ‘educational’ (in that it sought to combat criticism by disseminating its 
own ideas about what it is that the WTO is and does), it soon morphed into a mode of 
engagement principally about political neutralization. This change in policy has been most 
evident during ministerial conferences as well as during Public Forums but it has also been 
manifest in a shift in the language of publically available documents and the way the 
institution now presents itself virtually (a shift that the move from ‘10 common 
misunderstandings ...’ to ‘10 things the WTO can do’ illustrates).  
 
In seeking to defuse some of the political tension around meetings the secretariat has had 
some success. With regard to ministerial conferences, the secretariat has been able to meet 
the obligation of hosting these meetings while at the same time divorcing them from the 
‘heat’ of the negotiations and the ire of some quarters of civil society. This was the case at 
both the 2009 and 2011 Geneva ministerial conferences as well as—less expectedly so—at 
the 2013 Bali and 2015 Nairobi meetings (which, as we noted above, were both sparsely 
attended by representatives of civil society). As Scott and Wilkinson (2010) noted with 
regard to the 2009 Geneva conference: 
 
In sharp contrast to its previous ministerial gatherings, the World Trade 
Organization’s 7th ministerial conference in Geneva (30th November to 2nd 
                                                
4 For 10 misunderstandings about the WTO’ see 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/10mis_e/10m00_e.htm For ’10 things the WTO can do’ 
see http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/10thi_e/10thi00_e.htm  
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December 2009) proved to be something of a success. This was perhaps not 
surprising. The meeting was actively engineered from the outset to be a ‘non-
event’, an institutional stock-taking exercise, and a routine gathering rather 
than an ambitious negotiating session attracting large scale demonstrations 
and political grandstanding among the delegates.  
 
Scott and Wilkinson continued, 
 
[T]he meeting’s only real ‘success’ was that it was hosted in such a way that 
enabled some of the political heat to be taken out of WTO ministerial 
conferences moving the institution back to a more technocratic pace. This was 
precisely because, as Faizel Ismail, Head of the South African Delegation, put 
it, ‘there is zero going on’, a lack of industry (particularly with regard to the 
Doha round) which Alan Beattie likened to ‘the rough equivalent of holding 
the 1919 Versailles conference without talking about the war’ (Beattie, 2009). 
 
This strategy of neutralization has also been evident in WTO Public Forums (listed in table 
1). As noted above, a distinct shift has occurred in the nature of Public Forums, moving 
them away from venues in which civil society could be educated about the WTO and a 
place for public engagement with the organisation, to a politically neutral venue populated 
less by ‘the public’ and more by representatives of business and the legal and diplomatic 
professions taking advantage of the networking opportunities such gatherings now afford. 
At the 2013 Public Forum, for example, almost none of the major civil society players 
chose to put forward panel proposals for the sessions available. The second of the two 
plenary sessions was led by a particle physicist (Rolf-Dieter Heuer, Director General of the 
Conseil Européen pour la Recherche Nucléaire) who, by his own admission, had little to 
say that was about trade (and, it should be noted, whose presentation had little connection 
with the rest of the session). Very few of the panels comprised anyone with a core role in 
the WTO or the Doha negotiations. And the topic of debate—‘expanding trade through 
digital innovation’—was hardly the best choice just two months prior to the crucial Bali 
Ministerial, as noted by ambassadors, delegates and civil society representatives alike who 
openly expressed (in private conversations with us as well as in questions raised during 
panel sessions) their dissatisfaction and their intention not to attend in the future.  
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Table 1—WTO Public Forums and Symposia5 
2015—Trade works!6 
2014—Why trade matters to everyone 
2013—Expanding Trade through Innovation and the Digital Economy 
2012—Is Multilateralism in Crisis? 
2011—Seeking answers to global trade challenges 
2010—The Forces Shaping World Trade 
2009—Global Problems, Global Solutions: Towards Better Global Governance 
2008—Trading into the Future  
2007—How the WTO can help harness globalization? 
2006—“What WTO for the XXIst Century?” 
2005—WTO After 10 Years: Global Problems and Multilateral Solutions 
2004—Multilateralism at a crossroads 
2003—Challenges Ahead on the Road to Cancún 
2002—The Doha Development Agenda and beyond 
2001—Symposium on issues confronting the world trading system 
 
 
Irrespective of the problems with seeking to neutralize debate, what this strategy did was to 
put in place a mode of engagement that was very much directed at policing the boundaries 
of debate about trade and the WTO. Moreover, as the reasons underpinning this mode of 
engagement have changed from one directed at neutralising civil society hostility to one 
that pushes back against suggestions that the value of the WTO has been undermined by 
the lack of progress in the Doha round, a further consolidation of the secretariat’s strategy 
has unfolded. This comprises the establishment of ancillary functions and activities that are 
designed to lend the organisation credibility independent of what happens in the 
                                                
5 See https://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/public_forum15_e/public_forum15_e.htm 
6 The exclamation mark appears not on the WTO’s description of the forum but on the forum description 
on the dedicated website. Azevêdo suggested during the first plenary that a word was missing, that it should 
read ‘Trade works if …’ which of course fundamentally changes the meaning. 
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negotiations. It includes, among other things, the significant up-scaling of the institution’s 
data collection and analytical capacity, a joint initiative with the OECD to measure ‘value-
added in trade’, and a significant increase in the number of working papers produced. The 
secretariat has also made extensive use of video and podcast technology, YouTube, and 
Twitter. It has established a ‘chairs programme’ of identifying and appointing university 
professors with the title of ‘WTO Chair’ (ostensibly aimed at supporting the developing 
world in its trade policy strategies) designed to build lasting relationships with the 
institutions involved by encouraging members to engage in outreach and communication 
activities and to establish links with think tanks, but which actually has only appointed 
scholars uncritically disposed to the status quo.  
 
In 2011 the WTO launched its Youth Ambassador Programme (YAP)7 designed to increase 
awareness of trade issues among younger people, to encourage their participation in public 
discussions on this theme, and to introduce new perspectives to debates—albeit that this has 
been targeted at disseminating the ‘right’ kind of knowledge rather than facilitating genuine 
debate. In 2009, the WTO Essay Award for Young Economists was introduced—and with it 
a CHF5000 prize—to further promote links between academia and the WTO and ‘promote 
high-quality research on trade policy and international trade co-operation’. As the list of 
award winners attests, this is an activity that is aimed at promoting trade orthodoxy rather 
than engaging with heterodox viewpoints.8 
 
Across all of these activities a strategy can be seen in which the secretariat seeks to 
encourage engagement with civil society that is narrowly focused. Whether it is the way it 
seeks to neutralize political contestation during ministerial conferences and Public Forums, 
or the selection of a winner from the YAP, the emphasis is on promoting the ‘right’ kind of 
knowledge about the WTO rather than stimulating critical thinking or engagement. And 
while this might be an entirely understandable strategy for a secretariat feeling the heavy 
                                                
7 Notably the programme was suspended indefinitely after the 2014 Public Forum. 
8 See https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news15_e/rese_04feb15_e.htm for that list. 
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weather of a stalled (and now, a set aside) Doha round, the consequence has been to 
preserve an increasingly outmoded way of engaging with civil society. 
 
The result of all of this has been, first, to establish, then second, embed and consolidate an 
asymmetrical mode of engagement. Like all modes of engagement, as well as other 
institutional processes, once created they generate a life of their own. They establish a 
culture of operating that is learnt, carried forward, institutionalised and seldom 
questioned. Perhaps now we need to stand back and ask questions about whether this 
mode of engagement is really appropriate or fit for purpose. 
 
The impossibility of broader social outcomes from the existing mode of engagement 
Why does any of this matter? It matters because this mode of engagement is deeply 
constraining and it has resulted in a dry, unquestioning forum wherein the raising of 
concerns about the appropriateness of where the global trade system is going are excluded. 
For example, by determining the substantive agenda of the primary meetings during which 
the secretariat and civil society engage (such as the theme for each Public Forum), debate 
can only ever be about particular issues; and while it may facilitate the airing of differences 
of opinion, inevitably there is an underlying objective to promote one way of thinking 
about global trade and the WTO. It is important to note here that to criticize what has 
gone on in the Doha round or to call into question some of the tactics that members use 
to strong arm others into accepting deals they might not otherwise have accepted is not to 
be anti-trade, nor is it to be anti-WTO. It is certainly to raise questions about the kind of 
trade regulation that has prevailed over the past 70 years which has seen the industrial 
states get more of the opportunities they already have while simply letting the rest scramble 
around for what they can get; but it is not against an organisation that serves global 
commerce in a way that opens up opportunities to the excluded, which privileges capacity 
building in areas that have none (but in which potential exists), and it certainly is not a 
slight on the individuals who work in the secretariat.  
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The problem is that the mode of engagement that has developed between the secretariat 
and civil society is one that preserves the status quo and does not produce innovative 
thinking about the global trading system—some of which could actually contribute to its 
better and more effective functioning. As a result, nothing of substance, or of note comes 
out of WTO Public Forums or of the organisation’s engagement with civil society at 
ministerial conferences. Contacts are made, networks are established, information is 
gathered, and familiar arguments are rehearsed. While this is not without some value, a 
dialogue of this sort fails to generate an outcome beyond the purposes for which 
secretariat-civil society engagement was first designed. What a sufficiently significant 
outcome might look like is beside the point for present purposes, not least because we 
make no claim to represent civil society or the range of views held therein. What matters is 
that the chances of a mode of engagement producing something it was not designed to 
elicit are slim, in much the same way that WTO negotiations currently configured are 
unlikely to produce outcomes that are equitable and beneficial to all members (Wilkinson, 
2014). 
 
The possibilities that a changed mode of engagement holds 
Recent work concerning the influence of civil society on the WTO has drawn attention to 
the lack of success that coalitions of NGOs have had in either shaping or blocking the 
liberalisation agenda (Pianta, 2014; He and Murphy, 2007) and how this has been manifest 
in a problematic mobilisation against any form of multilateral trade agreement (de Bièvre, 
2014). Yet, engagement between the WTO and civil society is often portrayed as an 
important element of making the global trade system more legitimate and democratically 
accountable (Williams, 2011; Piewitt, 2010; Steffek, 2008; Higgott and Erman, 2010). In 
an early academic intervention on the relationship between civil society and the WTO, 
Scholte, O’Brien, and Williams (1998: 6-8) identified six benefits to the global trade regime 
of opening up to engaging with civil society, along with five potential problems if done 
badly. Since that time much has changed but as we argue above, the nature of the 
relationship has endured and the overall result amounts to a case of plus ça change, plus c’est 
la même chose. Many of Scholte, O’Brien, and Williams’ observations remain valid and 
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point to continued potential. For instance, they note that civil society groups could act as 
an important stimulus of debate about trade policies by generating new perspectives and 
proposals as well as pushing the WTO to clarify and perhaps rethink its positions. Yet 
failing to engage with a representative group of civil society organisations would impede 
this benefit. In addition, they note the potential democratising effects of greater 
engagement by citizens’ groups in the WTO, and the pitfalls of alienating potential civic 
partners if engagement with civil society were treated merely as a public relations exercise 
(Scholte, O’Brien and Williams, 1998: 7).  
 
Hannah (2016) also outlines several of the prospective benefits meaningful engagement 
with civil society could bring. The most obvious advantage is increased public awareness 
about the potential benefits and costs associated with liberalising global trade, particularly 
for the world’s poorest people. Yet, stimulating and improving the quality of public debate 
and deliberation about substantive trade policy issues, normative ideas about the 
egalitarian distribution of social goods, and the democratic quality of trade governance 
itself would also be a significant gain. Through meaningful engagement with civil society, 
the secretariat could widen policy debates and encourage the expression of multiple and 
critical views, even those that challenge prevailing trade orthodoxy. All too often those who 
deviate from dominant ways of thinking are silenced and accused of not understanding 
sufficiently the trade system (Eagleton-Pierce 2012; Hopewell 2016; Howse 2002; Siles-
Brügge 2013; Wilkinson 2014). Claims to expertise, exclusionary language and entrenched 
metaphors serve to limit debate and police the boundaries of who can contribute to trade 
debates and who cannot (Hannah, Scott and Trommer 2016). Weakening these barriers 
could give rise to a third prospective benefit: giving voice and recognition to otherwise 
marginalised groups that have been silenced by decades of asymmetric and iniquitous trade 
deals. Improving the transparency of multilateral trade negotiations may also result if civil 
society has forums in which to monitor, scrutinise and assess the development and impact 
of proposed trade policies. A fourth possible benefit is that civil society may also improve 
the accountability of trade negotiations by publicising grievances or naming and shaming 
in public contexts (Hannah, 2014). Finally, meaningful engagement with the WTO might 
	 23 
enable civil society to help convince trade policymakers to pursue policies aimed at 
producing welfare gains for all, safeguard public goods, and/or link trade rules up to 
progressive social values, human health, or sustainable development. 
 
Nonetheless, it must be acknowledged that the secretariat’s room for manoeuvre is 
currently limited because of its mandated relationship with WTO member states.  The 
primary function of the secretariat is to serve the needs, interests and priorities of WTO 
member states and to support their negotiating positions. More meaningful engagement 
with civil society would require that more autonomy be given to the secretariat in order to 
foster an environment where critical views are encouraged. A changed WTO secretariat-
civil society relationship might ensure the rules better serve the needs, interests and 
priorities of a wider range of members, particularly the poorest among them. 
 
The analysis above suggests that the mode of civil society engagement that the WTO has 
put into place has not made the most of the potential benefits and, simultaneously, not 
avoided all the pitfalls. While it is certainly understandable that a still nascent institution 
facing the kind of pressure precipitated by the events of Seattle in 1999 would seek to 
manage civil society engagement as a means of neutralising criticism, that time is now over. 
It is time to step back and confront the reality that the WTO has generated a type of 
engagement with civil society that is no longer fit for purpose. 
 
Looking ahead 
What should be done? How can the secretariat generate opportunities for civil society to 
challenge meaningfully and transform conventional wisdom about global trade? Here are a 
few ideas, most of which relate to the Public Forum but which resonate for broader 
secretariat-civil society engagement, particularly at ministerial conferences. 
 
First, the WTO should resist the temptation to define the terrain on which engagement 
with civil society takes place. At present, senior members of the secretariat, under the 
guidance of the Director General, agree on a topic for each Public Forum that determines 
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in large measure the areas of debate to be explored. Each panel proposal has to specify how 
it is addressing that core theme, though this rule may not be followed entirely to the letter 
when panels are chosen for inclusion. Nonetheless, it inevitably constrains areas of debate.  
 
Second, and relatedly, the WTO should take steps to allow civil society to have an input 
into the agenda setting process, possibly through the creation of a consultative committee 
that brings together representatives of civil society broadly defined. Currently, panellists for 
the Public Forum propose topics that are adjudicated by secretariat staff, with roughly a 50 
per cent success rate, based on quality and congruence with the overarching theme of the 
event. Broadening the selection process would increase the legitimacy, accountability, and 
transparency of civil society outreach by the WTO and ensure that the topics being 
discussed reflected the areas of concern to civil society. Such an improvement in secretariat 
autonomy over the Public Forum would also require the DG to play a less decisive roll in 
setting the theme and an openness to themes that may not speak to the interests and 
priorities of the most dominant WTO members. 
 
Third, the secretariat should allow a proverbial hundred flowers to blossom in the 
conversations that take place around trade. Too much effort is currently exerted in 
defending the benefits of trade and of the multilateral trade system to let genuine debate 
flourish. For instance, situating a debate around the topic ‘Trade Works!’—as it was in 
2015—necessarily gives a certain direction and hue to discussions, and largely excludes 
those who are more critical. While it is reasonable for the WTO to maintain some level of 
oversight concerning which groups can attend, this should be kept to a minimum. 
Excluding such voices closes off fulsome debate and limits the possible outcomes of civil 
society engagement with the WTO. 
 
Fourth, the secretariat should create opportunities for civil society to ask not what trade 
does, but what can trade do if we connect it up with a real development agenda that targets 
the poorest and least able, and that transfers knowledge that benefits everyone. This puts 
the secretariat in the role of enabler. By doing this, and not feeling the need to pursue 
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dogmatically one understanding of trade, the system is better held to account. 
Furthermore, a foundry of ideas is crafted out of which could emerge proposals that 
genuinely challenge the normative foundations of the multilateral trading system and rouse 
it from the malaise in which it finds itself. 
 
Fifth, we must be cognisant of the fact that the most critical elements of civil society and 
many of those who actively mobilized in opposition to the global trade agenda and the 
WTO in its early years have disappeared entirely from the scene. For example, Oxfam 
International, Third World Network, Médecins Sans Frontières, Aids Coalition to 
Unleash Power (Act Up), Greenpeace, ATTAC, Global Justice Now (formerly known as 
World Development Movement), ActionAid, and Friends of the Earth have all 
dramatically reduced (or even eliminated) their participation at Public Forums or 
ministerial conferences since 2005. They have lost interest in the WTO and the 
multilateral trading system and this points to a much broader challenge for secretariat-civil 
society relations. Re-engaging critical elements of civil society will require the secretariat to 
re-imagine the purposes of public dialogues about global trade and broaden opportunities 
for debate such that it centres on issues that resonate beyond the WTO and the Doha 
round. This will take much creative energy on the part of the secretariat and can only be 
achieved in consultation with civil society itself. Hosting civil society events organised 
around crosscutting issues related to mega-regional trade agreements, poverty alleviation, 
debt and finance, and sustainable development, among others, is one way to begin. 
 
Sixth, the secretariat must make a stronger effort to engage civil society from the global 
South in Public Forums and ministerial conferences. Although the External Relations unit 
does a good deal in terms of in-country and regional outreach for civil society (and media), 
providing opportunities for private, non-state, non-for-profit actors to engage in debate and 
dialogue with their counterparts from around the world will enrich and balance 
discussions about the possibilities of trade to work for global development and produce 
welfare gains for all. As Hannah (2014) argues: 
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NGOs from the North, in particular, are directed by Western-educated, 
middle class people who speak from a position of privilege. This raises 
questions about the appropriateness of NGOs claiming to give voice to the 
poor and marginalized in international trade negotiations, and raises the risk 
that NGOs may serve to reproduce social hierarchies or inequalities in the 
global economy.9 
 
If the transformative potential of civil society is to be realised and engagement with the 
WTO is to be fit for purpose, voices from the South must be included. 
 
So, the terms of engagement with civil society should not simply reflect what the secretariat 
thinks and wants. They should be determined in consultation with others beyond the 
doors of the WTO. For selecting the topics of the Public Forum in particular, there should 
be a committee that has a range of constituents on board that cover the whole spectrum of 
opinion so that they are all forced into a dialogue. Whatever it produces, it will be more 
democratic, accountable, legitimate, and transparent than before. It may even produce 
something genuinely progressive and transformative—an outcome that pushes back against 
conventional wisdom while generating new ideas geared towards health, welfare and 
sustainable development priorities.  
  
                                                
9 See also Brühl, 2010 and Beauzamy, 2010.  
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